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Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held
Corporations
Abstract
This essay describes the contours of the shareholder’s duty to be fair and explores some of the problems
caused by the law’s imprecision in defining the duty of fairness. Because this duty is best understood as a
rejection of old norms, part one of this essay describes the traditional doctrines of intra-corporate
responsibility. Part two describes the special characteristics of a close corporation and outlines how those
characteristics pushed close corporation law to new concepts of fairness and shareholder duties. Part three
attempts to delineate those duties of fairness and also to highlight some of the dangers that arise when the law
places fairness above predictability. Part four examines cases where close corporation law and employment
law overlap, and uses those cases to show that parties can put some limits on the ambiguity of “fairness.” Part
five uses the lesson from part four and makes concrete suggestions to practitioners.
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